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Abstract                                                                                                                                                                    
 
Two concepts from behavioural economics, loss aversion and mental accounting, have been 
combined to give a theoretical explanation of the equity premium puzzle. Most of the recent 
experimental results support the theory, as the behaviour of both students as well as 
professionals has been found to be consistent with myopic loss aversion (MLA).  
 
However, the main focus has been on investing for oneself and scarcely on investing on 
behalf of others. Many decisions, for example choices by fund managers affect not only their 
own potential performance pay but also clients returns. The outcome of these choices can 
again influence both future decisions by the fund manager and the amount that clients are 
willing to invest, and therefore influence the size of the equity premium.  
 
To investigate this further I ran an experiment with the aim of testing prior findings of MLA 
in investing for oneself, and more importantly on testing whether behaviour on behalf of 
others is similar. In order to test this I combined both investing for oneself and others in the 
same experiment using a within-design, and as far as the author is aware of, this has never 
been done before. Results show no MLA findings in investments on behalf of others, 
suggesting that participants are not influenced by the frequency of feedback when investing 
for others. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
In this paper I will study whether myopic loss aversion (MLA) serves as a possible solution to 
the equity premium puzzle. The equity premium puzzle (EPP) is that in the long-term stocks 
have outperformed bonds by a big margin and that this margin is difficult to explain, and thus 
is a puzzle. One of the possible explanations to the puzzle is myopic loss aversion (MLA), a 
behavioural theory that combines the fear of losses and frequency of evaluating investments.  
 
To investigate MLA as a possible solution to the EPP, I wanted to conduct an experiment with 
the aim of testing prior findings. In addition and more importantly, since there has been scarce 
research on how agents make choices on behalf of others, I added this element to the 
experiment design. The design is based on Gneezy and Potters experiment design from 1997. 
The participants shall decide how much they want to invest from 0 up to 100 in a lottery. In 
each round the participants will with 1/3 probability earn 2,5 times the invested amount and 
2/3 times they will lose the amount invested. The amount that they decide not to invest is a 
certain gain. The participants were also divided into two main groups. One group received 
low frequency (LF) of feedback and the other received high frequency (HF) of feedback.  
 
Gneezy and Potters’ participants invested only for themselves in 9 rounds. In my experiment, 
however, participants will make choices in two different conditions; for themselves (“own”) 
in six rounds and for “others” in six rounds. This change allows me to study differences in 
investment amounts between “own” and “others” as well as checking for MLA in both 
conditions. Finally, it allows me to do a robustness check of previous findings that men tend 
to invest more than women.  
 
The combination of both investing for oneself and others in the same experiment, has as far as 
the author is aware of, never been done with the GP-design before. This change in the design 
is relevant to the EPP since most prior research has focused on how people invest on behalf of 
themselves and little on how they invest for others. In the real world you often face decision-
making on behalf of others, either directly or indirectly. For example when one person in a 
couple invests, his or her decisions can influence the whole household economy. Another 
example is a fund manager or financial advisor where his or her decisions can influence both 
clients returns and his or her performance payment. Thus, if people exhibit MLA when 
investing on behalf of others, it can also influence the size of the equity premium. 
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Research on investment decisions made by individuals has found MLA a reliable source for 
explaining at least some of the premiums puzzle. Researchers have used students, financial 
advisors, teams and more recently adolescents in controlled experiments to test various 
hypotheses. A design first used in 1997 by Gneezy and Potters (GP) has often been used to 
test this. Except for Eriksen and Kvaløy (2010a), there have been no research with the GP-
design on behalf of others. Chakravarty, Harrison, Haruvy, and Rutström (2011), however, 
investigated participants choices on behalf of themselves and others in the same experiment, 
using a first price sealed bid auction, and a lottery choice task known as multiple price list 
(MPL).  
 
On 9
th
 of April 2013 I ran an experiment with 79 undergraduate students from the University 
of Stavanger to investigate MLA as a possible solution to the EPP. The results from the 
analysis between the frequency groups, LF and HF, are statistically different using Mann-
Whitney U-test when participants made choices for themselves (“own”), but not when 
deciding for “others”. The difference in “own” is greater in the last three rounds, than the first 
three, which points towards MLA. Therefore prior findings of MLA in “own” seem robust. 
Results in “others” is, however, not consistent with MLA, and thus contrary to the only 
published paper on investing for “others” with GP-design (Eriksen & Kvaløy, 2010a). There 
is, however, a statistical difference in LF but not in HF when comparing “own” vs “others”. 
Thus, people seem to take more risk when making choices for themselves compared to others, 
but this effect seems to be neutralized when you receive feedback more often. Men invested 
significantly more than women in both LF and HF and in total (LF+HF) according to Mann-
Whitney U-test. However the results were not significant when controlling for other factors, 
such as previous participation. 
 
The paper is divided into five main parts, first a theoretical part where I will go through 
relevant background theory, before going through the theory on equity premium puzzle and 
myopic loss aversion. In the second part I will go through relevant previous research and 
experiments. In the third part I will explain the experimental design and procedure. Then I 
move on to presenting the results from the experiment and my interpretation of the findings. 
In the end I draw conclusions and discuss the findings, before making some final reflections. 
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2.0 The theoretical part 
 
In the theoretical part of the thesis I will give an introduction to decision theory, the expected 
utility theory (EUT) and prospect theory (PT). These theories give an understanding of how a 
person rates different possible choices against each other, for example different investment 
alternatives.  Then I will account for how to value assets with the help of the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM). An extension to the CAPM, the consumer capital prizing model 
(CCAPM), will also be mentioned. The CAPM is an important foundation for understanding 
the equity premium puzzle (EPP), which leads to the main part of the thesis; myopic loss 
aversion (MLA). 
2.1 An introduction to decision theory 
 
The domain of decision theory deals with choice under uncertainty. There are at least two 
different approaches to this theory; the prescriptive approach and the descriptive approach. 
The differences between them are the views on human behaviour. The prescriptive approach 
focuses on how individuals should act, and assumes a perfect decision-maker who has full 
information as well as being able to decide with perfect accuracy and full rationality. In 
contrast the descriptive approach tries to describe how individuals actually make decisions. 
The approach does so by including psychological aspects of individuals and assumes that 
individuals do not always act rationally (Montier, 2002). 
Two approaches to decision theory is the expected utility theory and prospect theory. Daniel 
Bernoulli first initiated the expected utility theory in 1738, after founding the St. Petersburg 
Paradox in 1713. More than 200 years later the theory was accepted partly because of the 
axioms by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944). Eventually, during the 20th 
century, empirical studies made it clearer that individuals do not always behave rationally. 
The background for that was the documented violation of expected utility, known as the 
Allais Paradox and later also the Ellsberg Paradox, which will be explained later. Kahneman 
and Tversky later developed a behavioral economic theory named prospect theory (1979).  
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2.2 Expected utility theory 
 
Expected utility theory is a normative behavioral model which tries to explain how you 
rationally should choose between alternatives when faced with uncertainty. The theory 
predicts that a person faced with a situation of choice, will evaluate options on the basis of 
two factors; the likelihood of the outcome and the expected utility of the outcome. A good 
way to illustrate decision-making under risk is by using prospects. You can then assign 
probability to choices and then again find the expected utility of the prospect. The application 
of expected utility theory of choices between prospects is based on three tenets according to 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979). These tenents are expectation, asset integration and risk 
aversion.  
Expectation can be described as follows: U(X1, P1; ... ; Xn, Pn) = P1u(X1) +... +Pnu (Xn). That 
means that the overall utility of a prospect, denoted by U, is the expected utility of its 
outcomes, meaning the weighted average of all values. Asset integration (X1, P1; ... ; Xn, Pn) is 
acceptable at asset position w if U(w+X1,P1;….;w+Xn,Pn) > u(w). Thus, a prospect is 
acceptable if the utility resulting from integrating the prospect with one’s assets exceeds those 
assets alone. Risk aversion states that an individual is risk averse if he or she prefers a certain 
prospect x to any prospect with an expected value of x. A risk averse individual would rather 
have 100 for certain, compared to a 50-50 bet between 200 and nothing. In EUT, risk aversion 
is equivalent to the concavity of the utility function, and is also among the best known 
generalizations concerning risky choices (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). 
2.2.1 The four axioms of rationality 
 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) present four axioms that define the individual’s 
preferences in lotteries or prospects, and the expected utility theory is dependent on these. 
They are known as the axioms of rationality, and they make assumptions on completeness, 
continuousness, transitivity and independence. 
Completeness states that, if you have the option of A or B, you will rationally choose between 
them depending on your preferences. Thus you will either choose A over B, B over A, or be 
indifferent to the options. Transitivity is related to the consistency of the preferences, saying 
that if you prefer A over B, and B over C, you will prefer A over C as well. Continuousness 
assumes the relationship that, if an individual prefers A over B and B over C, then there will 
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be a chance, here noted as p, that B is as good as pA+(1-p)C. Therefore a small change in the 
composition could cause changes in the ranking. Lastly, the independence axiom says that 
you can mix two lotteries with a third lottery, without changing the preference order between 
the first two lotteries. 
If an individual is rational all the axioms above should be satisfied and the preferences can be 
represented by a utility function. Thus if an individual always chooses his or her most 
preferred alternative, then he or she will choose one gamble over another if and only if the 
expected utility of the gamble exceeds the other gamble and therefore maximizes his or her 
utility.  
2.2.2 Risk attitude and risk aversion 
 
Expected utility theory is set up to deal with risk and not uncertainty. A risky situation is one 
in which you know what the outcomes may be and can assign a probability to each outcome. 
Uncertainty is when you cannot assign probabilities or come up with a list of possible 
outcomes.  
According to Ackert & Deaves (2010) it is for most purposes, when considering decision-
making under risk, sufficient to think only in terms of wealth. To illustrate this I can give the 
following example, where we for simplicity think of a world with two only two possible 
outcomes; low wealth and high wealth. If the wealth is low it is 50,000 USD and wealth is 
high if it is 500,000 USD. Then we further assume that we can assign a probability for each 
outcome, say 50% chance for high wealth and 50% chance for low wealth. We then use the 
notation U(P) for the expected utility of the prospect, and u is the utility for each of the 
outcomes: 
U(P) = 0,50u(50,000) + 0,50u(500,000)  
It is common to assume that people have diminishing marginal utility of wealth. A 
logarithmic utility function is therefore often used when calculating the expected utility of this 
prospect. Results using a logarithmic function are as follows: 
U(P) =0,50(1,609) + 0,50(3,912) = 2,76 
This utility function can be useful when illustrating risk preferences. The expected value of 
wealth is 50,000*0,50+500,000*0,50=275,000, and the logarithmic utility from the expected 
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value is 3,31. A person with a logarithmic utility function therefore prefers the expected value 
of the prospect compared to the prospect itself, since 3,31 > 2,76 and thus u(E(W)) > U(P). 
This person would then rather have 275,000 USD in cash for certain instead of entering a 
lottery with a 50% chance of getting 50,000 USD and 50% chance of getting 500,000 USD. A 
person with these characteristics dislikes risk and is risk averse. 
A person that likes to take risks is called a risk seeker with preferences satisfying u(E(W)) < 
U(P), whereas a person that only cares about expected values and does not care about risks is 
called risk neutral, with preferences u(E(W)) = U(P). In the above example a risk seeker 
would gamble between getting 50,000 or 500,000 with equal probability, rather than getting 
275,000 for certain, while a risk neutral would be indifferent between the certain 275,000 and 
the 50-50 gamble between 50,000 or 500,000. Risk preferences are illustrated in figure 1. 
Figure 1 A Utility Function                                                                                                                        
 
If a person is risk neutral with this utility function U(x) equals x, risk loving if preferences 
satisfying x < U(x), and risk averse if preferences satisfy x > U(x). 
*Collected from University of Canterbury: 
http://www.econ.canterbury.ac.nz/personal_pages/john_fountain/econ223/week8/lect152010v1classhandout.html 
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2.2.3 Critics and violations of expected utility theory 
 
The main difference between expected utility theory and prospect theory is that whereas 
expected utility theory is about how the world should be, prospect theory focuses on how the 
world actually is. (Montier, 2002). 
Critics gradually began to rise against expected utility theory and thus prospect theory was 
eventually founded. The economist Maurice Allais was the first to recognize that expected 
utility theory is not descriptive of how individuals actually make choices. One violation of 
expected utility theory is known as the Allais Paradox.    
2.2.4 The Allais paradox 
 
The Allais paradox arises when comparing choices made by participants in two different 
experiments, each of which consists of a choice between two gambles, A and B. A well-
known example is as follows (Conlisk, 1989):     
Question 1: 
Gamble 1A 100% chance of winning 1 million                                                                        
Gamble 1B 89% chance of winning 1 million, 10% chance of winning 5 million and 1% 
chance of getting nothing. 
Question 2: 
Gamble 2A: 89% chance of winning nothing and 11% chance of winning 1 million               
Gamble 2B: 90% chance of winning nothing and 10% chance of winning 5 million 
The study by John Conlisk found that when presented with a choice between 1A and 1B, most 
people would choose 1A. Likewise, when presented with a choice between 2A and 2B, most 
people would choose 2B. It is fair to choose 1A alone or 2B alone but if the same individual 
would choose both 1A and 2B together it is inconsistent with expected utility theory. 
According to expected utility theory, this individual should choose either 1A and 2A or 1B 
and 2B. Why is it so? 
The inconsistency comes from the fact that in expected utility theory, equal outcomes added 
to each of the two choices should have no effect on the relative desirability of one gamble 
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over another. Each question gives the same outcome 89% of the time. Hence, if this 89% 
similarity is disregarded, then we are left with the same options. 
Thus, we can re-write the payoffs. After disregarding the 89% chance of winning the same 
outcome 1B is left offering a 1% chance of winning nothing and a 10% chance of winning $5 
million. 2B is left offering a 1% chance of winning nothing and a 10% chance of winning $5 
million. Therefore, 1B and 2B can be seen as the same choice. Thus, in the same way, 1A and 
2A should also be seen as same options. 
2.2.5 The Ellsberg paradox 
 
Another violation of EUT is the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg, 1961) which can be described 
with an example as follows: 
A box contains 30 red balls and 60 black and yellow balls, where the exact number of yellow 
and black balls respectively is unknown. You will draw a random ball from this box: 
Question 1. Do you prefer to put your money on a red ball (A) or a black ball (B)?                                                     
Question 2. Do you prefer to put your money on a red and yellow ball (C), or a black and 
yellow ball (D)?  
Since the alternatives are exactly the same, it follows that you will prefer A to B if and only if 
you believe that drawing a red ball is more likely than drawing a black ball. Also, there should 
be no clear preference between the choices if you thought that a red ball was as likely as a 
black ball. At the same time it states that you will prefer C to D, if and only if, you believe 
that drawing a red or yellow ball is more likely than drawing a black or yellow ball. It might 
seem intuitive that, if drawing a red ball is more likely than drawing a black ball, then 
drawing a red or yellow ball is also more likely than drawing a black or yellow ball. So, if you 
prefer A to B, it states that you will also prefer C to D, and if you prefer B to A, it states that 
you will also prefer D to C. Since research has shown that most people prefer A over B, as 
well as D over C this violates expected utility theory. 
Thus, a number of violations of expected utility theory, have been identified and this has led 
to the rise of alternative theories, with the most well-known being prospect theory. 
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2.3 Prospect theory 
Prospect theory was presented as an alternative to expected utility theory by the psychologists 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979). Kahneman later received the Nobel Memorial 
Prize in Economics in 2002; for having integrated insights from psychological research into 
economic science, especially concerning human judgment and decision-making under 
uncertainty. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) showed that individuals did not act according to 
expected utility on many occasions, for example when they asked these questions to a group 
of people: 
Choose between:                                                                                                                            
A. 25% chance to win $240 and 75% chance to lose $760 (0%)                                                                                
B. 25% chance to win $250 and 75% chance to lose $750 (100%) 
In this question all participants chose B over A as according to EUT. In the next question 
however: 
Decision (1) Choose between:                                                                                                                                   
A. A sure gain of $240 (84%)                                                                                                                                                       
B. 25% chance to gain $1,000 and 75% chance to gain nothing (16%) 
Decision (2) Choose between:                                                                                                                                     
C. A sure loss of $750 (13%)                                                                                                                                             
D. 75% chance to lose $1,000 and 25% chance to lose nothing (87%) 
In the second question a large majority of subjects made a risk averse choice for the sure gain 
(A) over the positive gamble (B) in the first decision, and an even larger majority of subjects 
made a risk seeking choice of gamble (D) over the sure loss (C) in the second decision. 
Actually 73% of the respondents chose A and D and only 3% chose B and C. This behaviour 
is not consistent with the EUT. 
In this case EUT cannot give an explanation of why individuals choose different alternatives 
on identical questions. EUT tells that an individual should not be affected on how choices are 
framed and presented. Problem 3 and 4 above shows just the opposite, and that the way 
choices are presented has a direct effect on the outcome of answers made by individuals. 
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With the help of empirical studies Kahneman and Tversky found three key aspects of 
behaviour patterns that proved contrary to EUT. First individuals can be both risk seeking and 
risk averse depending on how choices are presented. For example individuals can be risk 
seeking when it comes to losses and risk averse when it comes to gains. Second individuals 
will value different options or choices when it comes to changes in wealth, from a given 
reference point. This reference point is usually the status quo, thus the current situation. The 
third key observation is that individuals in general are loss averse meaning that losses loom 
larger than gains. From this Kahneman and Tversky provided a model of decision-making 
under risk that incorporates observed behaviour. 
2.3.1 The value function 
The value function in prospect theory replaces the utility function in the EUT. Instead of 
using simple probabilities, prospect theory uses decision weights. (Ackert & Deaves, 2010). 
The decision weights are a function of probabilities. Ackert and Deaves (2010) use v(z) to 
refer to the value of a change in wealth, where z refers to a wealth level. The value of the 
prospects is noted as V(P), and for a prospect P(pi, z1, z2) the value is: 
V(pi,z1,z2) = V(P) = ɲ(pi) * v(z1) + ɲ(1-pi) * v(z2) 
where ɲ is the decision weight associated with probability pi. V(P) the value of the prospect is 
the same as U(P) the expected utility of the prospect. 
As mentioned by Thaler (1999) mental accounting can be described as; a set of cognitive 
operations used by individuals and households to organize, evaluate, and keep track of 
financial activities. The value function has three important features, all of which captures an 
important element of mental accounting.   
First, the value function is defined over gains and losses relative to some reference point. The 
focus on changes, rather than wealth levels, as in the EUT, reflects mental accounting in 
practice. For example a single transaction is often evaluated by itself, rather than together 
with all other transactions. 
Second, the gain and loss functions display diminishing marginal sensitivity. Thus, the gain 
function is concave and the loss function is convex. This feature reflects that the difference 
between 5 and 10 dollars seem bigger than the difference between 505 and 510 dollars. 
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Third, it shows that individuals suffer from loss aversion, meaning that losing 100 dollars 
hurts more than gaining 100 dollars yields in pleasure. 
Figure 2 A typical value function                                                                                                 
 
Here you can see how choices are valuated from a given reference point (origo).                         
*Collected from Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
In this model a change in wealth from a reference point determine the value along the vertical 
axis, and not the terminal wealth. The value function is concave in the positive domain and 
convex in the negative domain. This indicates risk aversion in the positive domain and risk 
seeking in the negative domain, where it is also steeper in the negative domain, thus losses 
loom larger than gains. In general this indicates that people are loss averse since losses are felt 
more strongly than gains of the same size. 
For investors Kahneman and Tversky propose the following value function: 
U(x) = x
α
 if X≥0 
U(x) = -λ(-x)β if X≤0 
The parameter X shows the difference in wealth compared to the last time wealth was 
evaluated, and λ is a measure of loss aversion. Kahneman and Tversky have estimated α and β 
to be 0,88 and λ to be 2,25. An individual that is described by cumulative prospect theory is 
then only mildly risk averse for gambles that involve only gains. However he or she is 
strongly risk averse for gambles that can result in potential losses. Thus, the more often the 
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investor evaluates his or her portfolio with this value function, the more likely it is to have a 
significant effect on investment decisions. Therefore the more frequently the investor 
evaluates his or her investments, the more likely he or she is to experience periods where the 
risky investments will have a lower return than the safer portion of his or her portfolio. Risky 
investments are often referred to as stocks, and safer investments as bonds. If losses loom 
larger than gains, i.e. λ > 1, the investor would reduce the portion of risky assets the more 
often he or she evaluates the portfolio.  
2.3.2  The weighting function 
 
The weighting function in PT takes into account that people buy lottery tickets, where the 
expected payoff is less and often substantially less than the prize you paid. This symbolizes 
that people are being risk-seekers. The function also includes the observation that people buy 
insurance to reduce risk, even though the expected payoff is likely to be less than what you 
paid. This indicates a risk-averse behaviour. Prospect theory therefore incorporates 
overweighting of low-probability events by using decision weights (ɲ(pi)), rather than event 
probabilities (pi) to determine the value of prospects (Ackert & Deaves, 2010).  
Kahneman and Tversky found a fourfold pattern of risk attitudes (1992). This pattern suggests 
risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses when the probability of the outcome is high, 
as well as risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses when the probability of the 
outcome is low. Their paper along with the Allais Paradox show that individuals tend to 
overweight certain outcomes compared to outcomes that are likely.  
This leads to the typical weighting function, where low probability and certain outcomes are 
overweighting compared to likely ones. Kahneman and Tversky describe this phenomenon as 
the certainty effect.  
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Figure 3 The Weighting Function  
 
This is a typical picture of how individuals’ weight options, where low probability events are 
over-weighted, medium and high-probability events under-weighted and certain events equal-
weighted.                                                                                                                           
*Collected from Ackert and Deaves (2010, page 43) 
Prospect theory has been used a lot in economic research and has been especially useful when 
it comes to behavioural finance. Behavioural finance combines both ideas from psychological 
and traditional economic theory to describe an individual’s behaviour. Models from 
behavioural finance with the introduction of a descriptive model for human behaviour have 
increased our understanding of individual decision-making. These models have also given us 
a framework to investigate the many puzzles which has been observed in financial research, 
for example the equity premium puzzle (EPP), which will be explained after the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM) and the consumer capital asset model (CCAPM). 
2.4 The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 
 
Assets that pay off when times are good and consumption levels are high - that is, when the 
incremental value of additional consumption is low - are less desirable than those that pay off 
an equivalent amount when times are bad and additional consumption is more desirable and 
more highly valued. (Mehra & Prescott, 1985). 
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This can be illustrated with the well-known theoretical model for stock pricing, the capital 
asset model. To derive the CAPM we need two assumptions (Bodie, Merton, & Cleeton, 
2009). First, the investors agree in their forecasts of expected rates of return, standard 
deviations, and correlations of the risky securities, and they therefore optimally hold risky 
assets in the same relative proportions. Second, the investors generally behave optimally. In 
equilibrium, the prices of securities adjust so that when investors are holding their optimal 
portfolios, the aggregate demand for each security is equal to its supply. 
Thus, the capital asset pricing model shows the relationship between a stocks beta (β ) which 
is a measure of systematic risk and the expected return. The expected rate of return for a stock 
can then be presented as follows (Hveem, Mjølhus, Norstoga, & Plahte, 2010): 
E(R) = rf + β(E(Rm) – rf) 
Where rf is the risk free rate (a rate of return of an investment with no risk of financial loss),  
β a measure of the stocks sensitivity to the market in general and E(Rm) the expected rate of 
return in the market, i.e.  the sum of the risk free rate and the risk premium. Therefore a stock 
with a high beta will have a higher expected rate of return than the market in general. 
Likewise a stock with a low beta will have a lower expected rate of return than the market in 
general.  
2.5 The consumer capital asset pricing model (CCAPM) 
 
The CCAPM is a financial model that extends the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to 
include the amount that an individual or firm seeks to consume in the future. The CCAPM 
therefore uses consumption measures, which includes a consumption beta, in its calculation of 
a given investment’s expected return. This beta for consumption tries to measure the 
covariance between an investor’s ability to consume goods and services from investments, 
and the return from a market index. The CCAPM is in practice used more seldom than the 
CAPM and it is often advised that the model should only be used on a theoretical basis. In 
particular, many consumers do not actively take part in the stock market and thus the link 
between consumption and stock returns assumed by the CCAPM cannot hold. 
The model builds on the idea that an investor prefers investments that gives more dividends or 
has a value increase when consumption falls. Such an investment will give the investor the 
possibility to maintain his or her consumption level because he or she receives dividends or 
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could sell of a part of the investment at a satisfying price. In periods where the consumption 
level is high it is not important whether the investment pays out dividends or increase in 
value. Therefore investments that are positively correlated with consumption are less 
attractive compared to investments that are negatively correlated with consumption. Mehra 
and Prescott describes it as follows in the paper The Equity Premium Puzzle in Retrospect 
(2003): 
Another perspective on asset pricing emphasizes that economic agents prefer to smooth 
patterns of consumption over time. Assets that pay off a larger amount at times when 
consumption is already high “destabilize” these patterns of consumption, whereas assets that 
pay off when consumption levels are low “smooth” out consumption. Naturally, the latter are 
more valuable and thus require a lower rate of return to induce investors to hold these assets. 
 
There are different methods that can be used to estimate the equity premium. The most 
common is to estimate the difference between the return on a stock market index and a 10-
year bond. Based on historical returns it is a common assumption that the equity premium will 
be around 5% in the future (Ackert & Deaves, 2010). How can this be explained? 
2.6 Equity premium puzzle (EPP) 
 
As followed from CAPM, the equity premium can be defined as the gap between the expected 
return on the aggregate stock market and a portfolio of fixed-income securities. The equity 
premium puzzle is that, in the long-term, stocks have outperformed bonds by a big margin, 
and that this high premium is difficult to explain. According to Mehra and Prescott (1985) this 
premium was around 6% between 1889 to 1978. One could also say that the EPP is the lack of 
an explanation that people still invest in government bonds, even though higher returns 
historically has been achieved by stocks.  
Mehra and Prescott find that the difference in the covariance of returns between stocks and 
bonds with the growth of consumption, is only large enough to explain the difference in the 
average returns if the investor is implausibly averse to risk. They therefore claim that such a 
large premium is a puzzle since it according to conventional economic models would imply a 
coefficient of risk-aversion in excess of 30. This coefficient implies that a person would be 
indifferent between $51,209 for certain and a 50-50 bet between $50,000 and $100,000 
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(Mankiw & Zeldes, 1991). This doesn’t seem realistic and Siegel and Thaler (1997) call it 
absurd.  
According to Phillipe Weil (1989), you might as well call the puzzle the risk free rate puzzle, 
since the risk free rate has been so low. Weil shows, using the same data as Mehra and 
Prescott (1985) that a second anomaly is present. This is based on the following argument; 
even though individuals like consumption to be smooth over time, and although the risk-free 
rate has been very low, individuals still save enough so that the per capita consumption grows 
rapidly. This phenomenon is referred to as the risk-free rate puzzle. 
According to Credit Suisse Global Investment Returns Yearbook 2012, the equity premium 
has been 3,5% relative to bonds between 1900-2011, and only 0,4% between 1962-2011, 
negative 1,9% between 1987-2011 and negative 4,5% between 2000 and 2011 in a globally 
diversified portfolio. Some therefore argue that there is no equity premium puzzle at all since 
there has not been a positive premium in the later years.  
Other explanations that have been suggested are that the time period analysed by Mehra and 
Prescott isn’t long enough to confirm the puzzle. Another mentioned explanation is 
“survivorship bias” by Reitz (1988). He argues that investors might be rationally worried 
about a small chance of an economic disaster of some kind that might have happened even 
though it hasn’t yet. Myopic loss aversion (MLA) is another possible explanation, and by far 
the most relevant for my thesis and experiment. For extensions to explanations and other 
possible solutions to the equity premium puzzle, see Anomalies: The Equity Premium Puzzle 
by Siegel and Thaler (1997). 
2.7 Myopic loss aversion (MLA) 
 
The equity premium puzzle just discussed was put forward by Mehra and Prescott (1985). 
They refer to the enormous discrepancy between return on stocks and fixed income securities, 
and thus the unreasonably high levels of risk aversion that is needed to explain why investors 
are willing to hold bonds, and not allocate all their money in stocks. Several potential 
explanations and solutions for the equity premium puzzle have been proposed, with one of the 
most prominent being the theory of myopic loss aversion.  
Myopic loss aversion was developed by Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and is based on two 
concepts from the psychology of decision-making, namely loss aversion and mental 
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accounting. Loss aversion refers to the tendency that individuals seem to be more sensitive to 
losses than gains. Loss aversion also plays a central role in decision-making under uncertainty 
in prospect theory as presented earlier (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
The second behavioural concept Benartzi and Thaler (1995) present is mental accounting, 
which in the MLA-context refers to the implicit methods individuals use to code and evaluate 
financial outcomes. Both these concepts are illustrated in an example first presented by 
Samuelson (1963): 
Samuelson offered a colleague a fifty-fifty bet of winning $200 or losing $100, an offer which 
he refused. The colleague however said he was willing to accept 100 such bets. This provoked 
Samuelson into proving a theorem to show that his colleague was irrational. A simple utility 
function, where x represents a change in wealth relative to status quo that would prove this 
was presented as follows: 
U(x) = x if x≥0 and 2,5x if x<0. 
With this utility function the expected value of a single bet will be negative                             
but positive with two or more bets; 
One bet; -(2,5*100)*0,5+200*0,5= negative 25                                                                                                     
The attractiveness of two bets depends on the mental accounting rules being used. If each play 
of the bet is treated as a separate event, then two plays of the gamble are twice as bad as one 
play. However, if the bets are combined into a portfolio, then the two bets will yield a positive 
expected utility with the above utility function, and as the number of repetitions increases the 
portfolio becomes even more attractive. 
 
 
Two bets; -(2,5*200)*0,25+100*0,5+400*0,25 = positive 25 
Mental accounting is illustrated in this utility function by the fact that the colleague would 
turn down one bet, but accept two or more bets as long as he didn`t have to watch the bet 
being played out. Loss aversion is also illustrated by the notion that the colleague would be 
more willing to take a risk if he didn’t evaluate the performance frequently, thus evaluating 
the bets as a portfolio of two bets, rather than independent single bets. 
It is fair to draw a parallel with the above example to an investor that is going to invest in 
stocks and fixed income securities. If the investor is loss-averse, the evaluation period will be 
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an influential factor for the investor’s attitude towards risk. The risky asset(s) will seem more 
attractive the longer periods he tends to hold it, as long as the investment is not evaluated 
frequently. Relatively risk-free assets, such as bonds, do not display losses as often as more 
risky assets and is therefore not as likely to be affected by MLA in same extent.  
Based on the above discussion, MLA has shown to influence investment results and decisions. 
Investors that check the value of their portfolio with great frequency are more likely to be 
subject to MLA. Most investors now have the possibility to check their portfolio's valuation 
on a daily basis, i.e. they can expose themselves to the pain of losses. This pain can easily 
cause them to deviate from a thoroughly thought investment plan. This might especially 
happen in bear markets when the frequency and intensity of the pain is high. Investors can 
then become liable to a condition known as convex investing, which indicate behaviour of 
buying when prices are high and selling when prices are low. 
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) argue that organizations such as pension funds could also be 
subject to MLA. The reason behind this is that pension funds are likely to exist as long as the 
company exists and thus the percentage amount placed in stocks should be high because of 
the long-term perspective and the historical risk premium. The fund manager is however not 
likely to be in his or her position forever, and regular reporting of results could create a 
conflict of interest because of this short horizon perspective. 
One known example that could be directly related to MLA is the change that Bank Hapoalim 
in Israel made in February 1999. The bank decided to send fund reports only quarterly and not 
monthly liked they used to. The customers could of course check their investments daily but if 
they didn’t log on to their account and check their investments they wouldn`t get feedback as 
frequently as before. The banks expectations were that the investors would hold their 
investments for longer periods. Their argument was as follows; investors should not be scared 
by the occasional drop in prices. 
There have been plenty of research and experiments with the aim of finding evidence for 
MLA and my experiment has the aim of testing these prior findings. In the next part of the 
thesis I will look at relevant prior research and prior experiments to the one I am going to 
conduct.                     
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3.0 Relevant prior research and experiments 
 
3.1 Experimental economics 
Experimental economics is the application of experimental methods
 
for studying economic 
questions, while an experiment is a procedure with the aim of verifying, falsifying, or 
establishing the validity of a hypothesis. Experiments are used to help understand why and 
how for example stock markets function the way they do.   
Experiments can vary in both goal and scale, but they always rely on repeatable procedure 
and logical analysis of the results. The data that are collected in experiments can be used to 
estimate and test the validity of economic theories, and provide insight into causal effects by 
finding the outcomes that occur when a particular factor is manipulated. I will now comment 
on some strengths and weaknesses of experimental economics. 
3.2 Comments on strengths and weaknesses  
 
The main strength of experimental economics as I see it is the possibility to replicate or make 
close to similar experiments. If someone thinks that a student pool of 79 students in my 
experiment could be too small to generalize the results, they could run an experiment with 
more students and/or “real people”, like financial advisors. The more often an experiment is 
repeated, with similar results obtained, the more confident we can be that the theory that is 
tested is valid. If the design is criticised they can argue against it, make well-argued changes 
and see if it influences the findings.    
George Loewenstein (1999) has described some problems regarding experimental economics. 
Experimental method is often seen as strong on validity, but Loewenstein questioned whether 
this method is sufficient to both internal and external validity. Internal validity is the ability to 
infer causal relationships from the specific research, whereas external validity is the ability to 
generalize the research context into settings that the research is intended to mimic. 
Loewenstein focuses on external validity in his commentary, where he suggests that 
experimental economics are particularly vulnerable. 
Experimental economics can also be limited by problems with experimental incentive 
structures. In the real-world people face complex incentives, and thus identifying meaningful 
incentive structures can be difficult. For example subjects initially motivated by intellectual 
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curiosity and a desire to be helpful, can be distracted and demotivated by small experimental 
payments. This issue has been discussed by Gneezy and Rustichini (Gneezy & Rustichini, 
2000a, 2000b). When it comes to my experiment I can`t see this influencing one group more 
than another though. 
The “House-money-effect” could also influence experimental economics. This effect was 
presented by Thaler and Johnson (Thaler & Johnson, 1990) and shows that people tend to take 
more risk if he or she has earned money easily or unexpectedly: The premise that people are 
more willing to take risks with money they obtained easily or unexpectedly. 
 
In my experiment the participants got 100 experimental units, equalling 16 NOK (2,75 USD), 
in each of the 12 rounds. Since participants got the chance of investing the money in a lottery 
(”gamble”) a house-money-effect could occur since participants could tend to take more risks. 
This because of no risk of losing money they previously had (no participation fee) and feeling 
that “everything is a bonus”. Thaler and Johnson (1990) also found that people are less 
willing to take risks after a loss compared to after a win. I think that the house-money-effect 
might influence the amount of risk aversion each individual shows in the experiment, but it is 
not likely to influence one group more than the other. 
 
Harrison and List (2004) point out the fact that using students as subjects in experiments have 
been commonly criticized and that “real people” may be preferable. The design that I used in 
my experiment has been used on “real people” (financial traders etc.) earlier and shown 
similar main results. Therefore I don’t see this criticism as an argument against the validity of 
my potential main findings, and in any case this is a common critisism to any lab experiment 
using student subjects. If my budget wasn’t limited however, I would have considered having 
both a larger student pool and a control group of “real people”. 
Another concern often raised is that students might be self-selected in some way. I therefore 
asked the participants to fill out a questionnaire after the experiment. In this way I could 
control for some of these factors in the analysis. In my case, a recruitment bias might exist 
since people that neither are on Facebook nor check their student email would not have 
received information about the date and time of the experiment sessions, unless a friend or 
associate told them. Because of restrictions on the student-email account regarding sending 
emails, I was only able to send around 1200 emails a day. Thus only students with a first 
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name starting with letters A-K got an email before the participants list was fully booked, but 
again this is not likely to affect one group more than the other. 
3.3 Earlier practice and conducting of experiments 
 
In this part I will look on previous experiments that are related to my experiment. The focus 
will be on relevant previous experiments regarding risk-taking on behalf of oneself, on behalf 
of others and gender differences. The reader will also get some background information on 
how experiments have been designed and executed previously. 
3.3.1 Students 
 
Gneezy and Potters (1997) designed their lottery after Benartzi and Thaler (1995) proposed 
myopic loss aversion as a possible solution to the equity premium puzzle. They conducted 14 
experiment sessions, seven in each of the two treatment groups. Their experiments were 
conducted using pen and paper and the participants were students from the Tilburg 
University. The participants were told that the experiment would last around 40 minutes and 
that they would get a reward depending on the choices they made, but normally between 5 
and 35 Dutch guilders. The choice they were given was to invest between 0 and up to 100 in a 
lottery. In each round the chance for winning in the lottery was 1/3, and the risk of losing was 
2/3. The students that won received 2,5 times the amount invested, while the amount that was 
not invested was earned for certain. On average, investing in the lottery yielded a return of 
16,67%. 
Gneezy and Potters divided into two different treatments and the experiments had nine 
rounds. In each treatment half of the students received high frequency feedback, meaning they 
received feedback from the outcome of the lottery after each round, while the other group 
only received feedback every third round.  
The idea behind the two treatments was to manipulate the evaluation period. In treatment LF 
(low frequency of feedback) the frequency of choice and information feedback was lower 
than in treatment HF (high frequency of feedback). Therefore the subjects in LF were 
expected to evaluate the consequences of betting in a more aggregated way, i.e. that if 
subjects were characterized by MLA, the low frequency group would be more opt to bet 
money in the lotteries. In fact, this was exactly what happened, as the low frequency group on 
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average invested 66,7 percent in the lottery compared to the high frequency group’s average 
of 50,1 percent.  
3.3.2 Professional traders and financial advisors 
 
Haigh and List (2005) conducted a similar experiment as Gneezy and Potters (1997). The 
difference though was that they invited professional traders as well as students to participate 
in the experiment. Their main finding was that professional traders exhibited myopic loss 
aversion (MLA) to an even greater extent than students. Professional traders invested as much 
as nearly 75 units in the low frequency treatments and as low as 45 units in the high frequency 
treatment. The gap between student choices in the different treatments was much lower, 62,5 
versus 50,89, which was quite similar to the results from Gneezy and Potters (1997) . 
Eriksen and Kvaløy (2010b) made use of all SR-Bank’s, a medium sized Norwegian bank, 
financial advisors to conduct a similar experiment as Haigh and List. Their paper was a 
robustness check of Haigh and List’s rather surprising findings that financial advisors exhibit 
MLA to a greater extent than students. The advisors invested 68,6 and 47,8 in the lottery 
while students invested 59,1 versus 49,2, thus the financial advisors exhibited MLA to a 
greater extent than students, and this is consistent with Haigh and List’s findings. 
3.3.3 Other people’s money 
 
As Eriksen and Kvaløy (2010a) pointed out, literature was scant on the basic question of how 
people behave when taking risks on behalf of others, given the large experimental literature 
on risk-taking. They therefore wanted to investigate this issue further. The standard rational 
model namely has a clear prediction that there should be no MLA-effect when investing other 
people`s money. They used the same design as GP to investigate whether MLA was shown 
when investing money on behalf of others. 
On the contrary to the standard rational model Eriksen and Kvaløy (2010a), found that 
“investment managers” reacted to manipulation of frequency in the same way as people did 
when investing their own money, thus exhibiting behaviour consistent with myopic loss 
aversion. Interestingly they also found that groups of subjects, especially men, took less risks 
with other people’s money than with their own. They found this by comparing the group that 
made choices on behalf of themselves, “own”, against the group that made choices on behalf 
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of “others”. The groups “own” and “others” did not consist of the same individuals and were 
conducted on separate occasions. 
Chakravarty, Harrison, Haruvy, and Rutström (2011) used a first price sealed bid auction, as 
well as a lottery choice task known as multiple price list (MPL) in their experiment, to test for 
differences between “own” and “others”. In the MPL task the subjects were faced with the 
task of choosing lottery A or lottery B on each row in a table. At some point in the table 
subjects are expected to switch between the alternatives, thus this can be used to infer their 
risk attitudes. In the sealed bid auction the participants acted as both “agent” and “self”, thus 
the exact same individuals made choices both for themselves and for others in the same 
experiment. This is contrary to previous experiments as experimenters previously only 
compared groups that acted on behalf of themselves with the results to a group that acted on 
behalf of others, thus the individual participant didn`t participate in both conditions (“own” as 
well as “others”). 
Chakavatry et al. (2011) thus found an opposite conclusion to Eriksen and Kvaløy (2010a) 
with the remarkable result that individuals tend to be significantly less risk averse when they 
make decisions about another person`s money, compared to decisions made with their own 
money. 
3.3.4 Gender differences 
 
One of the most common stereotypes is that women are more risk-averse than men. Charness 
and Gneezy (2007) assembled data from 10 sets of experiments and found very consistent 
result that women invest less, and thus appear to be more financially risk averse than men. 
They do though underline some problems with the empirical investigation of individual 
differences in risk-taking, namely the variation in the methods used to study the phenomenon, 
making it difficult to compare results across experiments. They also argue that some papers 
found gender differences without looking for them and that others were specifically designed 
to examine for gender differences. 
Barber and Odean (2001) wanted to test two predictions, after psychologists, in areas such as 
finance found that men are more overconfident than women. The two predictions were; men 
will trade more than women and the performance of men will be hurt more by excessive 
trading than the performance of women. They tested these hypotheses by analysing 35,000 
household accounts at a large discount brokerage firm. Accounts opened by men nearly had 
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turnover rates of common stocks 1,5 times the accounts opened by women. Men’s net returns 
were also on average 0,94 percentage points lower than for women. The difference is even 
larger when they compared single men vs single women. Single men on average traded 67% 
more than women and thereby reduced their returns by 1,44 percentage points.  
Eriksen and Kvaløy (2010a), using the GP-design, found that men on average invested 52,8 
and 50,7 in the different treatments, whereas women invested less, 40,8 and 40,3 respectively.  
3.3.5 Teams and adolescents 
 
Matthias Sutter (2005) found that team decisions are also characterized by myopic loss 
aversion, and that teams also invest significantly more than individuals do. This had according 
to Sutter three main implications. First, it supported the validity and applicability of the 
theoretical concept of MLA for a wider range of decision-makers, namely teams as well as 
individuals. Second, the results show that MLA is a valid explanation for the equity premium 
puzzle, irrespective of which type of decision-maker that is present on financial markets. 
Third, the result has practical relevance for organizations since important financial decisions 
often are taken by teams rather than individuals. 
Another study by Matthias Sutter and colleagues was whether MLA was present during 
adolescence (Glätze-Rützler, Sutter, & Zeileis, 2013). Surprisingly, their findings suggested 
no evidence of MLA in a sample of 755 individuals between ages of 11 to 18. MLA was 
neither present when they made individual decisions nor when they made team-decisions. 
However men as expected invested more than women. In my opinion these results does not 
discredit MLA as a possible explanation for the equity premium puzzle since the financial 
markets are dominated by investors over the age of 18. 
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4.0 Experiment design and procedure 
 
4.1 The Gneezy and Potters experimental design 
 
Since the design of my experiment is very similar to Gneezy and Potters well-known design 
(1997), I will first describe their design and then present the changes I introduce. 
The objective of their experiment was to test for myopic loss aversion (MLA). In order to test 
this, the groups were given different feedback frequency. The high frequency groups received 
feedback each round and the low frequency groups received feedback only every third round. 
All participants would make choices for themselves in 9 rounds. In each round the chances of 
winning in the lottery were 1/3, and the risk of losing is 2/3. If they won the subjects would 
receive 2,5 times the amount invested, i.e. if they invested 100 and won, they would get paid 
350 in that round. The amount that was not invested would be returned for certain without any 
chance of losing or winning. Thus, if they invested 0 in the lottery they would receive 100 
with a probability of 1. On average, investing in the lottery yields a return of 16,67%. The 
experiment by Gneezy and Potters was conducted using pen and paper. 
There are connections between the lottery design to the real world. In the real world the 
possibility to get feedback or evaluate your portfolio only each third period or year is 
available, since you can decide for yourself how often you wish to check your portfolio. In the 
real world there is also options regarding how much you want to invest in risky and safe 
investments, just as in the lottery design. You can invest everything in stocks, everything in 
bonds, or a combination since rebalancing funds exist. Rebalancing funds have a fixed sum of 
both stocks and bonds, for example SKAGEN Balanse 60/40, where 60% is invested in stocks 
and 40% in bonds and rebalanced on a daily basis (Skagenfondene, 2013).  
4.2 The changes to the original design  
 
The lottery is the same as in GP’s design (1997). Each round the participants in my 
experiment will receive 100 EK (experimental units), which equals 16 NOK (Norwegian 
kroner).  
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The first design change is that the participants would make choices on how much to invest for 
12 rounds instead of the original nine
1
. This is caused by the next important design change. 
Instead of making decisions only on behalf of themselves, participants were also going to 
make decisions on behalf of others. In six rounds the participants were going to make choices 
on behalf of themselves (“own”) and could affect their own payment. In the six other rounds 
they were going to make choices on behalf of another person in the room (“others”). In the 
rounds deciding for another the choices would only affect the payment of the other person. 
The other person in the room would in the same six rounds make choices that affected the 
other person’s payment. The participants didn’t know which person in the room they were 
making choices on behalf of. The reason behind this design change was that I wanted the 
participants to make as many choices for themselves and for others in the same experiment, 
using a within-design. This “twist” has as far as I am aware of never been executed and tested 
before.  
To test for MLA, half of the participants received feedback each round (high frequency) and 
the rest received feedback only each third round (low frequency). In each frequency group, 
half of the participants would start with deciding for themselves and the other half will start 
deciding for others. The reason for this is to limit the influence learning effect that during the 
rounds could have an effect on the final result. In previous research participants have shown a 
tendency to reduce the amount of investment in the later rounds and I did not want this to 
potentially influence only “own” or only “others”. The different treatment groups and within-
design are then as follows: 
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1
 To use 9 rounds in deciding for oneself and for others would mean 18 rounds in total and the real money potential 
pay-off would have had to be reduced because of budget constraints. In addition it would be more time-consuming for 
participants than previous similar experiment sessions, where 9 or 12 rounds in total are most common. 
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After the first 6 rounds there will be a short questionnaire to make it clearer that the first game 
has ended and the next game is about to begin (see pages 48 and 50-53 in the appendix). After 
the last 6 rounds there will be a longer questionnaire with relevant background questions. In 
each game the participants will get questions indicating specifically in which of the “own” or 
”others”-treatment they are in. In high frequency the question on the screen will be as follows 
when deciding for oneself (translated to English): “How much do you want to invest in the 
lottery for yourself in round X”. When deciding for others the question will be: “How much 
do you want to invest in the lottery for another person in round X.”  
There was also change in the information given about the lottery. Instead of the original 
100+2,5X as an additional explanation of the lottery in a parenthesis, the following text was 
given: If you invest 100 you will 1 out of 3 times receive 350 and 2 out of 3 times receive 
nothing. Instead of 100-X as additional information about the amount that is not invested in 
the lottery, the following example was given: If you invest 0 in the lottery you will receive 
100 for certain. The idea behind this change was to make the lottery even easier to 
understand. None of the 79 participants asked any questions about the instructions. 
My experiment was also computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), and not on pen and 
paper like Gneezy and Potters (1997) did
2
.  
                                                     
2
 One of the reasons behind this change was to limit the amount of sessions needed to complete the results for all the 
four groups. When using the lab each group only needed one session for completion, thus for example reducing the 
potential “word of mouth effect” that could have influenced students participating in later sessions. It is also likely that 
it was less time-consuming for the participants as well as being a more commonly known process for students in 
Stavanger, because of prior experiments with z-Tree, for example by Eriksen and Kvaløy at the university. 
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4.3 Hypotheses 
 
Because of prior experiments lack of consensus decision-making on behalf of others (see 
Chapter 4: Relevant research, experiments and experimental literature) I wanted to construct 
an experiment that could investigate the issue further, as well as testing the robustness of prior 
findings that men take more risk than women. In addition, I also wanted to investigate 
whether people with high frequency of feedback would take less risk than people with less 
frequent feedback. I therefore ended up with the following three hypotheses: 
1. The high frequency feedback groups will invest significantly less in the lottery 
compared to the groups with low feedback frequency 
2. Decision-making on behalf of others compared to decision-making on behalf of 
oneself will not differ from decision-making on behalf of others, when it comes to the 
amount of investment in the lottery 
3. Men will invest significantly more than women in the lottery 
 
4.4 The reasons behind choosing this design and procedure 
 
The design has been used several times before and the results I get will be comparable with 
previous research. The changes I have made in the experiment-design, namely deciding for 
oneself and others in the same experiment using a within-design adds a new dimension. It will 
be interesting to see whether the results are similar to prior research, and it will especially 
intriguing to see what effects, if any, the design change has on the results. This new element 
has as far as I am aware of never been done with the GP-design before.  
Another reason I find this change interesting is that investing not only on behalf of oneself but 
also on behalf of others on more or less the same occasion is quite common, yet very little 
research has been done on this. When it comes to fund saving agreements, couples can either 
have separate accounts or one account together. Often however there is only one person that 
makes decisions for both. One acquaintance of mine who decides which funds to invest in on 
a monthly basis in two separate accounts (one for himself and one for his girlfriend) had this 
to say about their monthly investments: “In my account I have mostly got stocks but I don’t 
think my girlfriend wants to take that much risk so in her account I invest more in bonds.” 
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Fund managers often invest their own money in the same fund they manage thus they are 
often indirectly investing for themselves as well as for others. 
The reason for choosing students is mainly that it was the only way I could get up to 20 
people in each group without “breaking the budget”. Students are both cheaper payment wise, 
as well as being easier to contact and organize regarding conducting experiments. 
4.5 Participants and the day of the experiment 
 
All together 79 undergraduate students from the University of Stavanger, participated in the 
experiment. They were recruited on their student email-account and from student-organization 
groups on Facebook. They were told that they had the opportunity to participate in an 
economic experiment where they could earn a decent sum of money.  
There were a total of 39 students in the low frequency (LF) groups and 40 in the high 
frequency (HF) groups: 
 Low frequency 1 (own, others), 19 
 Low frequency 2 (others, own), 20 
 High frequency 1 (own, others), 20 
 High frequency 2 (others, own), 20 
The reason that the low frequency 1 group wasn’t complete was that a student who didn`t 
understand Norwegian turned up, and participants had already started reading the instructions 
when she informed me of this. I therefore felt that finding a replacement in such a short space 
of time could influence the other ones (noisier circumstances during the reading of 
instructions) as well as the potential new subject 20 would also have got less time to read the 
instructions than the others. Since there was no subject 20 to influence the payment of subject 
19 in the “others part” of the experiment, subject 19 got paid the average of what the other 18 
subjects earned when choosing for “others”. 
Sessions were held at 10:00, 11:00, 13:00 and 14:00 on April 9th. “Boxes” where set up on 
the computers in advance to avoid insight from one participant to another. The LF sessions 
took around 15 minutes and the HF sessions around 20 minutes (see appendix page 45 for 
picture). After each session the participants received anonymous payment. In total 16,815 
NOK were paid out to the participants, an average of 212,85 NOK each. (see appendix page 
54 for all separate payments in each session). 
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5.0 Results 
 
5.1 The Main Picture 
 
Table 1. The amount of investment in each of the four main groups 
  Own Others 
High Frequency (HF) 65 63,2 
Low Frequency (LF) 77,3 63,7 
 
When combining the results from the four different groups, the participants that received high 
frequency feedback (HF) invested on average 65 when making choices for themselves and 
63,2 when investing for others, whereas the participants with low frequency invested as much 
as 77,3 when deciding for themselves and 63,7 when making choices for others. 
 
In HF there were a total of 18 men and 22 women, and in LF 17 men and 22 women, thus 
when it comes to gender the groups were pretty evenly split. When it comes to previous 
experiment participation there were 27 in the LF treatment and 23 in HF treatment, thus a 
pretty even split there as well, and therefore not likely to influence one group more than 
another. None of the background questions influenced results except for previous 
participation. To see the background questions that were asked and the GLS-regression 
random effect result see appendix page 49 and 55. 
 
In general investment levels are higher in my experiment compared to previous similar 
experiments. Investment levels in Gneezy and Potters (1997) were 66,7 in LF and 50,1 in HF 
while in my treatments combined, as you can see in table 2, was higher. A possible 
explanation for higher investment amounts is that many participants have previously 
participated in similar experiments. As can be seen in the regression in the appendix, the 
group of people that had participated in similar experiments invested, on average, around 18 
more than people that hadn’t participated before. The change in investment design could also 
have had an effect. 
 
To test for significant differences between groups I used the Mann Whitney U-test at 95% 
level which has been commonly used when analysing results from experiments with the GP-
design. The Mann-Whitney U is a non-parametric statistic test whether the null hypothesis 
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that two populations are the same hold against an alternative hypothesis. If the test goes in 
favour of the alternative hypotheses, a particular population may have larger values than the 
other. One limitation to this test is that the data points should be independent of one another. 
Since I have used results in blocks (three rounds equals one data point) like Gneezy & Potters 
(1997), all participants have influenced four data points in the analysis (12 rounds divided by 
3) and those are not necessarily independent of one another (how you choose the first three 
rounds is likely to influence how you choose in the last three rounds etc.).  
Except when comparing own results in HF against investment on behalf of others in HF, I 
have used “blocks” (each participant = 4 observations, like Gneezy and Potters) when 
comparing differences in investment levels between participants. When comparing own 
investments in HF against investments on behalf of others in HF, I compared 12 observations 
of each participant, but added “blocks” results in the parenthesis. 
To control for other factors, like previous participation, I have in addition run an ordinary 
least squares (OLS) and a generalized least squares (GLS) random effects panel data test. 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) are a method in statistics for estimating the parameters of a 
multiple linear regression model. The OLS estimates are obtained by minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals between the observed responses in the dataset and the responses that are 
predicted by the linear approximation. Generalized least squares (GLS) are a method in 
statistics for estimating the unknown parameters in a linear regression model. The GLS can be 
used when variances of the observations are unsimilar, i.e. there is heteroscedasticity, and/or 
when there is a certain degree of correlation between observations. If one or both of these are 
present, OLS can be statistically inefficient. 
5.2 High- and low frequency feedback 
 
The first hypotheses is directly related to myopic loss aversion and is that high frequency 
feedback groups will invest significantly less in the lottery compared to the groups with low 
feedback frequency. 
 
From table 2 you can see that participants invested significantly less in the HF treatment 
compared to the LF treatment, when you combine decisions on behalf of oneself as well as in 
the new element others. In table 2 the investment in LF is close to constant in all rounds while 
the investments fall in the last three rounds in HF. Thus, by comparing raw investment 
averages, the total combined investments points towards MLA. However, the regressions in 
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table 5 and 6, do not confirm a statistical difference (between HF- and LF combined) when 
controlling for gender and previous participation. 
 
Table 2 The combined results LF (own and others) vs HF (own and others) 
 
  HF combined LF combined   
  Mean St.d Mean St.d Mann Whitney  Significance 
First 3* 66,7 33,7 70,2 31,9 -1,33 No 
Last 3* 61,5 38,5 70,8 35,2 -2,6 Yes 
Total 64,1 36,3 70,5 33,5 -2,75 Yes 
*First three means the first three rounds in each game (own and others), while last three means last three rounds 
in each game (own and others). This is the same in all “combined” tables. Significance level is 5%, which means 
that a result of 1,96 and above and -1,96 and below is significant. This is the same in all tables. 
 
One interesting thing to notice if we move to table 4 is that, if we separate ”own” from 
”others”, the picture changes. As previously people that invest with their own money suffer 
from MLA and there is statistical difference between the HF and the LF group in “own”. 
However there is no statistical difference between HF and LF when it comes to investing on 
behalf of others, as you can see in table 4. Thus, results in “others” suggest that participants 
are not influenced by the frequency of feedback when it comes to the amount they invest for 
other people. This is in contrast to MLA findings in Eriksen and Kvaløy (2010a), when 
investing on behalf of others. The participants invested on behalf of both themselves and 
others in the same experiment due to the design-change, and since the results differ from 
previous studies, this should encourage further research on investing for “others”. 
 
In three out of the four main groups, see table 3, people invest less in the last three rounds 
compared to the first three rounds. It is only when they invest for themselves in low frequency 
(LF own) that the investment is higher, whereas participants seem to take less risks towards 
the end in the three other groups. The overall picture therefore points towards MLA. 
 
Table 3: Investments from the four main groups 
           
  HF Own HF Others LF Own LF Others 
  Mean St.d Mean St.d   Mean St.d  Mean    St.d 
First 3* 67,1 34,3 66,3 33,2     75 28,4 65,4 34,4 
Last 3* 62,8 40 60,2 37,1     79,6 30 61,9 37,8 
Total 65 37,3 63,2 35,3 77,3 29,3 63,7 36,1 
*First three means the first three rounds in the game, while last three means last three rounds in the game. This is 
the same in all tables, except the “combined” tables. 
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Table 4: The connection between LF own and others vs HF own and others 
 
  Means            St.ds Mann Whitney U Significance 
LF own vs HF own 77,3 65 29,3 37,3 -3,26 Yes 
LF others vs HF others 63,7 63,2 36,1 35,3 -0,48 No 
LF total vs HF total 64,1 36,3 70,5 33,5 -2,75 Yes 
 
Table 5: Regression 1 OLS, The significance of gender differences when controlling for 
previous participation and frequency, and the significance of frequency when controlling for 
gender and previous participation (frequency and gender could influence each other). 
               Number. Obs: 316   
Source SS df MS F (3, 312) = 10.53 
 Model 29282,6 3 9760,5 Prob > F = 0,0   
Residual 289212,7 312 927 R-squared = 0,0919 
 Total 318495,3 315 1011,1 Adj. R-squared = 0,0832 
        Root MSE = 30.446   
Invest Coeffsient 
Std. 
Error       t P>ǀtǀ 95% conf-interval 
Highfrequency -4,8 3,44 -1,39 0,164 -11,57 1,97 
Female -6,69 3,45 -1,94 0,054 -13,49 0,1066 
Previous Participation 17,06 3,55 4,81 0 10,07 24,03 
Constant 62,89 3,99 15,77 0 55,04 70,74 
*The dependent variable is the invested amount (constant). The independent variables takes into account which 
treatment the participants were in (LF or HF), gender (female or male),  and controls for differences caused by 
previous participation. 
 
Table 6: Regression 2 GLS, The significance of gender differences when controlling for 
previous participation and frequency, and the significance of frequency when controlling for 
gender and previous participation (frequency and gender could influence each other). 
    R-squared       
Number of observations 316 Within 0 Prob > chi2 = 0,0 0,0022 sigma_u 18,68 
Number of groups 79 Between 0,1672 Wald chi2(3) 19,91 sigma_e 24,16 
Obs. Per group 4 Overall 0,0919     rho=0,374 
Invest Coeffsient Std. Error      z       P>ǀzǀ 95% conf-interval 
Highfrequency -4,85 5 -0,97        0,333 -14,66       4,97 
Female -6,72 5,02 -1,34        0,181 -16,56       3,13 
Previous Participation 16,62 5,1 3,26        0,001 6,62      26,62 
Constant 62,89 5,77 10,95        0 51,88      74,51 
*The dependent variable is the invested amount (constant). The independent variables takes into account which 
treatment the participants were in (LF or HF), gender (female or male), and controls for differences caused by 
previous participation. 
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5.3 Investing for oneself and for others 
 
The second hypotheses is that there will not be a significant difference between the groups on 
decision-making on behalf of others compared to decision-making on behalf of oneself when 
it comes to the amount of investment in the lottery. 
 
If we include investments from both frequency groups when comparing investments in the 
own- and others condition as shown in table 7, the hypothesis is rejected since there is a 
significant difference between the mean investments of the two groups. This is especially 
strong for the difference in amounts invested in the last three rounds of the lottery. 
Participants invest the same in the first and last three rounds in the “own” treatment, whereas 
they invest less in the last three rounds compared to the first three when making choices on 
behalf of others. The regressions, in table 9 and 10, also confirm statistical difference in 
investments (between own and others combined) when controlling for participation in similar 
experiments. 
 
Table 7: The connection between own combined (both LF and HF) and others combined 
(both LF and HF) 
 
            
  Own Combined Others Combined Mann-Whitney U   
  Mean St.d Mean St.d  +/-1,96 Significance 
First 3  71  37,7  65,9  37,4 -1,39 No 
Last 3  71,1  36,4  61  36,1 -3,22 Yes 
Total  71,05  34,1  63,44  35,7 -3,33 Yes 
 
If we look on LF and HF separately however, i.e LF own vs LF others, and HF own vs HF 
others (see table 8), there is only significant difference in one group, which is LF. Thus, it 
seems like the difference in investment for oneself and on behalf of others gets neutralized the 
more often one can evaluate investments and the more frequently one receives feedback. The 
investments in LF between own and others are statistically different, and in LF the 
participants take higher risk for themselves than they do on behalf of others. Even though the 
investment amounts are higher in HF own compared to HF others, the investments are not 
statistically different, however the tendency is similar.  Going back to hypothesis 2, 
participants seem to take more risks when making choices for themselves compared to others, 
but this effect looks to be neutralized the more often they receive feedback. The HF-group 
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(“own” vs “others”) made choices according to the hypothesis, whereas the LF-group (“own” 
vs “others”) did not. 
 
Thus, it is only in the results in the LF-treatment that are consistent with prior research of 
Eriksen and Kvaløy (2010a), suggesting higher investments for oneself than on behalf of 
others. However, as previously stated, they compared the choices of two separate groups of 
participants acting either for “own” or “others” and not both in the same experiment, like in 
my within-design.  
 
Table 8: The connection between LF own vs LF others, and HF own vs HF others 
 
  Means St.ds Mann Whitney U Significance 
LF own vs LF others 77,3 63,7 29,3 36,1 -3,86 Yes 
HF own vs HF others 65 63,2 37,3 35,3  -0,8* (-0,34) No 
*-0,8 is the 12 vs 12 results (all participants=12 observations). Result in parenthesis is the “blocks” result (one 
participants= 4 observations) 
 An interesting sidenote: Eriksen and Kvaløy (2010a) found that particularly men invested less 
on behalf of others compared to women, but my results point in the opposite direction since 
men invested 74,1 on behalf of themselves and 68,9 on behalf of others, a difference of 
negative 5,2, while women invested 68,6 on behalf of themselves and 59,1 on behalf of 
others, a difference of negative 9,5. See table page 47 in appendix. 
 
Table 9: Regression 3 OLS, The significance of others controlling for previous participation 
 
        Number. Obs: 316   
Source SS   df MS F (2, 313) = 39,18 
 Model 28796,4    2 14398,2 Prob > F = 0,0   
Residual 289697,9   313 925,6 R-squared = 0,0904 
 Total 318494,3  315 1011,1 Adj. R-squared = 0,0846 
        Root MSE = 30,42   
Invest Coeffsient Std.Error      t P>ǀtǀ 95% conf-interval 
Others -7,71 3,42 -2,25 0,025 -14,44 -0,97 
Previous Participation 18,02 3,52 5,12 0 11,09 24,95 
Constant 60 3,25 18,49 0 53,6 66,4 
*The dependent variable is the invested amount (constant). The independent variables takes into account which 
condition the participants were in (own/others) and controls for differences caused by previous participation. 
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Table 10: Regression 4 GLS, The significance of others controlling for previous participation 
    R-squared       
Number of observations 316 Within 0,0311 Prob > chi2 = 0,0 0 sigma_u 18,45 
Number of groups 79 Between 0,1381 Wald chi2(3) 19,91 sigma_e 24,50 
Obs. Per group 4 Overall 0,09047     rho=0,362 
Invest Coeffsient Std. Error z         P>ǀzǀ 95% conf-interval 
Others -7,71 2,71 -2,84 0,005 -13,03     -2,39 
Previous Participation 17,66 5,08 3,48 0,001 7,7     27,62 
Constant 60,21 4,22 14,26 0 51,94     68,49 
*The dependent variable is the invested amount (constant). The independent variables takes into account which 
condition the participants were in (own/others) and controls for differences caused by previous participation. 
 
5.4 Men and women’s investments 
 
The third hypothesis is that men will invest significantly more than women in the lottery. As 
you can see from table 11 and table 12, this looks to be true in both LF, HF and both 
frequencies combined (HF+LF). Thus, prior research (Charness & Gneezy, 2007) seems to be 
robust, as this experiment is in line with these findings. The regressions in table 5 and 6 
however do not confirm a statistical difference on a 95% level (between men and women) 
when controlling for condition (own and others) and previous participation. The OLS-
regression is however very close to being statistically different on a 95% level. The 
regressions do indicate though that other factors than gender are more important for the 
investments levels. When you look on investments levels between men and women without 
controlling for other factors, there is no doubt that there is statistical difference. 
 
Table 11: The combined results men (own and others) vs women (own and others) 
 
  
  Men Combined Women Combined            Mann Whitney U Significance 
  Mean St.d Mean St.d     
First 3 72 35,3 65,6 30,5 -1,26 Yes 
Last 3 71 38 62,1 36,1 -2,28 Yes 
Total 71,5 36,6 63,9 33,4 -2,6 Yes 
 
Table 12: The connection between HF men vs HF women, and LF men vs LF women 
 
  Means St.ds Mann Whitney U Significance 
HF men vs HF women 69 60,1 36 36     -3,37* (-1,72) Yes 
LF men vs LF women 74,1 67,7 37,2 30,2             -2,12 Yes 
 
      *Since all participants made 12 choices in highfrequency I find it most relevant to compare 12 vs 12 when 
comparing results in HF againts each other. With the HF vs HF exception, I have used blocks (4 vs 4) like 
Gneezy and Potters (1997). Results in “blocks” are in paranthesis. 
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6.0 Conclusion 
 
When acting on behalf of themselves participants seem to exhibit MLA, but there were no 
significant differences when investing for others. The result in others is especially interesting, 
considering my experiment design change, and that previous experimenters didn’t test both 
conditions (“own” and “others”) with exactly the same participants. When it comes to the 
equity premium puzzle and MLA as a possible explanation, the results from my experiment 
are also interesting, as you can easily claim that the stock markets have investors that invest 
on behalf of others. It is, however, difficult to draw an explicit line in which of the findings of 
“own” or “others” that is most relevant for the real world. This is because you often find 
yourself in a situation which you invest on behalf of others as well as for yourself (fund 
managers etc.), alternatively think of others while investing for oneself (partner etc.). The 
combined investments of own money and on behalf of others (see table 2), could therefore be 
closer to the real world. Results from the experiment suggest that the average investments of 
investors having low frequency of decisions are higher than investors having high frequency 
of investment decisions. This in turn suggests there is MLA present in investor’s investment 
decisions. 
An experiment with a fixed share of payments between paired participants might get a closer 
approximation to the real world, than the combined results of investments with own- and 
others money. However, “the weighting of thinking” of oneself or others, when it comes to 
investing, is likely to be different from one person to another and thus difficult to examine. As 
there is statistical difference in investments in LF on behalf of others but not in the HF 
treatment, it seems like the difference in investment for “own” and “others” gets neutralized 
the more often you can evaluate investments and the more frequently you receive feedback. 
Men invested statistically more than women in both HF and LF with a Mann-Whitney U, but 
not when controlling for other factors with OLS and GLS-panel data tests. To conclude 
explicitly one way or the other on these two hypotheses thus seems difficult. 
Depending on how you weight the results, MLA may or may not be a plausible solution to the 
equity premium puzzle. If I focus on results in “own”, as most previous research, the answer 
would be yes. The combined results (“own” and “others” summarized), also point towards 
MLA as a possible solution to the EPP. However, results show no MLA findings in 
investments on behalf of others, suggesting that participants are not influenced by the 
frequency of feedback when investing for others. 
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7.0 Final reflections 
 
I hope that my Master’s thesis will encourage other experimenters to use the same concept, 
only testing it directly on financial advisors, as results between students and financial advisors 
in previous studies have shown to be significantly different. A robustness check of the results 
on students could also be appropriate since a group of 20 is sensitive to outliers and thus has 
the potential to be too small in order to be robust. Another version of my experiment design 
could also be to have different feedback frequency in the same groups when you make 
choices on behalf of themselves compared to others and vice versa.  
Another one could be to have the same experiment over 12 rounds where paired participants 
investments are equally shared 50-50, and check if the participants exhibit MLA. Results from 
an experiment with that design might be even closer to the real world since most investments 
in the financial markets are made not only on behalf of oneself but also on behalf of others, 
either because they are customers or since it could affect the whole household economy of the 
investor. However, since the enjoyable journey of writing my thesis and conducting an 
experiment is now over, I will like to leave these reflections open for other experimenters to 
investigate. 
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Appendix 
 
Some pictures from the day of the experiment: 
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LF, HF and total results: 
 
LF total  Round 1-3   Round 4-6   Round 7-9   Round 10-12   Round 1-12  
  Mean St.d Obs. Mean St.d Obs. Mean St.d Obs. Mean St.d Obs. Mean St.d Obs. 
All 67,4 32,2 117 72,5 32,7 117 73,1 31,4 117 69 37,6 117 70,5 33,5 468 
Men 70,3 35,3 51 74,1 35,8 51 76,8 38,3 51 75,3 40 51 74,1 37,2 204 
Women 65,1 29,7 66 71,3 30,2 66 70,2 24,8 66 64,1 35,2 66 67,7 30,2 264 
Own 74,7 26,1 57 83,7 27,2 57 75,2 30,7 60 75,8 32,2 60 77,3 29,3 234 
Others 60,4 35,9 60 62 34,1 60 70,8 32,3 57 61,8 41,6 57 63,7 36,1 234 
Men own 74,2 29,8 18 91,7 19,2 18 82,3 30,9 33 80 34,4 33 81,8 30,3 102 
Men oth. 68,2 38,2 33 64,5 39,3 33 66,7 48,5 18 66,7 48,5 18 66,5 41,8 102 
Women own 75 34,7 39 80 29,7 39 66,6 28,6 27 70,7 29,2 27 73,9 28,1 132 
Women oth. 50,8 30,8 27 58,8 26,8 27 72,7 21,8 39 59,6 38,5 39 61,5 31 132 
                HF total  Round 1-3   Round 4-6   Round 7-9   Round 10-12   Round 1-12  
  Mean St.d Obs. Mean St.d Obs. Mean St.d Obs. Mean St.d Obs. Mean St.d Obs. 
All 63,9 34,4 120 58,4 39 120 69,4 32,9 120 64,7 38 120 64,1 36,3 480 
Men 64,3 36 54 62,2 39,8 54 76,7 30,8 54 72,9 35,9 54 69 36 216 
Women 63,6 33,2 66 55,2 38,4 66 63,5 33,6 66 57,9 38,5 66 60,1 36 264 
Own 73,5 35,4 60 62,1 43,2 60 60,7 32,2 60 63,6 36,9 60 65 37,3 240 
Others 54,4 30,7 60 54,7 34,3 60 78,2 31,5 60 65,7 39,2 60 63,2 35,3 240 
Men own 64,1 42,1 27 59,6 43,9 27 70,2 33,5 27 73,8 36,6 27 66,9 39,1 108 
Men oth. 64,5 29,4 27 64,7 36 27 83,1 26,9 27 72 36 27 71,1 32,8 108 
Women own 81,2 36,8 33 64,1 45,8 33 52,9 32,5 33 55,2 35,4 33 63,4 35,9 132 
Women oth. 46,1 29,6 33 46,4 31 33 74,2 34,8 33 60,6 41,6 33 56,8 36,1 132 
                All total  Round 1-3   Round 4-6   Round 7-9   Round 10-12   Round 1-12  
  Mean St.d Obs. Mean St.d Obs. Mean St.d Obs. Mean St.d Obs. Mean St.d Obs. 
All 65,6 33,3 237 65,4 36,7 237 71,2 32,2 237 66,8 37,8 237 67,3 35,1 948 
Men 67,2 35,6 105 68 38,2 105 76,7 34,5 105 74,1 37,8 105 71,5 36,6 420 
Women 64,4 31,4 132 63,3 35,4 132 66,8 29,6 132 61 36,9 132 63,9 33,4 528 
Own 74,1 31,1 117 72,6 37,8 117 67,9 32,1 120 69,7 35 120 71,1 34,1 474 
Others 57,4 33,4 120 58,3 34,2 120 74,6 32 117 63,8 40,3 117 63,4 35,7 474 
Men own 68,1 37,6 45 72,4 39,1 45 76,8 32,4 60 77,2 35,2 60 74,1 35,7 210 
Men oth. 66,5 34,3 60 64,6 37,5 60 76,6 37,4 45 69,9 41 45 68,9 37,4 210 
Women own 77,8 25,8 72 72,7 37,2 72 59 29,5 60 62,2 33,5 60 68,6 32,5 264 
Women oth. 48,2 30 60 52 29,6 60 73,4 28,3 72 60,1 39,7 72 59,1 33,7 264 
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The four individual group results: 
LF1  Round 1-3   Round 4-6   Round 7-9   Round 10-12   Round 1-12  
  Mean St.d Obs. Mean St.d Obs. Mean St.d Obs. Mean St.d Obs. Mean St.d Obs. 
All 74,7 26,1 57 83,7 27,2 57 70,8 32,3 57 61,8 41,6 57 72,75 31,8 228 
Men 74,2 29,8 18 91,7 19,2 18 66,7 48,5 18 66,7 48,5 18 74,825 36,5 72 
Women 75 34,7 39 80 29,7 39 72,7 21,8 39 59,6 38,5 39 71,825 31,175 156 
                LF2  Round 1-3   Round 4-6   Round 7-9   Round 10-12   Round 1-12  
  Mean St.d Obs. Mean St.d Obs. Mean St.d Obs. Mean St.d Obs. Mean St.d Obs. 
All 60,4 35,9 60 62 34,1 60 75,2 30,7 60 75,8 32,2 60 68,35 33,225 240 
Men 68,2 38,2 33 64,5 39,3 33 82,3 30,9 33 80 34,4 33 73,75 35,7 132 
Women 50,8 30,8 27 58,8 26,8 27 66,6 28,6 27 70,7 29,2 27 61,725 28,85 108 
                HF1  Round 1-3   Round 4-6   Round 7-9   Round 10-12   Round 1-12  
  Mean St.d Obs. Mean St.d Obs. Mean St.d Obs. Mean St.d Obs. Mean St.d Obs. 
All 73,5 35,4 60 62,1 43,2 60 78,2 31,5 60 65,7 39,2 60 69,875 37,325 240 
Men 64,1 42,1 27 59,6 43,9 27 83,1 26,9 27 72 36 27 69,7 37,225 108 
Women 81,2 36,8 33 64,06 45,8 33 74,2 34,8 33 60,6 41,6 33 70,015 39,75 132 
                HF2  Round 1-3   Round 4-6   Round 7-9   Round 10-12   Round 1-12  
  Mean St.d Obs. Mean St.d Obs. Mean St.d Obs. Mean St.d Obs. Mean St.d Obs. 
All 54,4 30,7 60 54,7 34,3 60 60,7 32,2 60 63,6 36,9 60 58,35 33,525 240 
Men 64,5 29,4 27 64,7 36 27 70,2 33,5 27 73,8 36,6 27 68,3 33,875 108 
Women 46,1 29,6 33 46,4 31 33 52,9 32,5 33 55,2 35,4 33 50,14 32,125 132 
 
 
Questionnaires (translated from Norwegian): 
 
Questionnaire after game 1 
 Write PC-number (see the receipt-sheet) 
 Would you like to participate in other experiments? (yes or no) 
Following message after questions: Then game 2 will soon start 
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Questionnaire after game 2 
 Age 
 Gender 
 Branch of study/Faculty 
 Write short how you were thinking when investing in the lottery 
 Closest average grade 
 Have you participated in an experiment before? 
 Do you invest in stocks or stock funds? 
 How well is your knowledge about stocks and stock funds? (over average, average, 
under average) 
 Have you taken the course Behavioural Finance? 
 How many study-years have you had at the UiS? 
 Marital status?  
 Have you taken the course Personal Finance? 
 In what game did you invest the most in the lottery? 
 
Following message after questions: Thank you for participating! Fill in everything on the 
receipt-sheet except the amount. Bring the receipt-sheet and wait outside the room. You 
will shortly be called in one by one and get paid as soon as we have summarized the 
payment from both games. 
 
Receipt sheet (translated from Norwegian) 
 
Receipt sheet: 
 
PC-number: ..............                            
 
I confirm to have participated in an experiment on ...09.04.13..... 
And received an amount of ....................... 
                                                
Name/Signature....................................................................... 
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Experiment instructions: 
Instructions to the experiment (translated from Norwegian, group LF1) 
1. The experiment consists of 2 games with 6 rounds. After game 1 there will be a short 
questionnaire, while it after game 2 will be a longer questionnaire. 
2. You shall make investment choices on behalf of yourself the first six rounds (game 1), while 
you in the last six rounds (game 2) shall make decisions on behalf of another.  
3. You will start with 100 experimental units (EK) in every round.  
 
How do the investment choices work?  
 You shall for three rounds at a time decide how much you want to invest in a lottery (from 0 to 
100) 
 With 1/3 chance the lottery will give you 2,5 times the investment in return, and with 2/3 
chance you will lose the investment. (Example: If you invest 100 then 1 out of 3 times you 
will receive 350 and 2 out of 3 times you will get 0 in return)                                                                                                        
 The amount you choose not to invest will be yours for certain (Example: If you bet 0 in the 
lottery you get 100 in the round for certain) 
 You as participant will randomly be divided into type 1, 2 or 3, and every round one of the 
three types will randomly be drawn as a winner  
 100 EK is equal to 16 Norwegian kroner (NOK) every round. 
 
Game 1 
In this game you shall make investment choices on behalf of yourself. Here you will influence your 
payment. After round 3 you will get the results from round 1 to 3. Thereafter you must decide how 
much you want to invest in the lottery in round 4 to 6. 
Game 2 
In this game you will make investment choices on behalf of another person in the same way as game 
1. The choices you make will influence another participant’s payment. One randomly chosen 
participant will do the same for you. 
Payment 
The amount of Norwegian kroner (NOK) you have after the first 6 rounds will be paid out after both 
game 1 and game 2 are finished. In game 2 another participant will have made choices that affect your 
payment in game 2. 
Practical information 
Follow the instructions on the screen, enter (0 to 100) and press the OK-button along the way. Take 
into account that there might be some waiting during the experiment. You shall not talk and/or have 
contact with other participants. If you have got any questions, raise your hand and we will answer. 
After the experiment is over, you write your name on the receipt sheet, then you go and wait outside 
the room. You will then shortly be called in one by one. 
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Instructions to the experiment (translated from Norwegian, group LF2) 
1. The experiment consists of 2 games with 6 rounds. After game 1 there will be a short 
questionnaire, while it after game 2 will be a longer questionnaire. 
2. You shall make investment choices on behalf of another the first six rounds (game 1), while 
you in the last six rounds (game 2) shall make decisions on behalf of yourself.  
3. You will start with 100 experimental units (EK) in every round.  
 
How do the investment choices work?  
 You shall for three rounds at a time decide how much you want to invest in a lottery (from 0 to 
100) 
 With 1/3 chance the lottery will give you 2,5 times the investment in return, and with 2/3 
chance you will lose the investment. (Example: If you invest 100 then 1 out of 3 times you 
will receive 350 and 2 out of 3 times you will get 0 in return)                                                                                                        
 The amount you choose not to invest will be yours for certain (Example: If you bet 0 in the 
lottery you get 100 in the round for certain) 
 You as participant will randomly be divided into type 1, 2 or 3, and every round one of the 
three types will randomly be drawn as a winner  
 100 EK is equal to 16 Norwegian kroner (NOK) every round. 
 
Game 1 
In this game you shall make investment choices on behalf of another. The choices you make will 
influence another participant’s payment. One randomly chosen participant will do the same for you. 
After round 3 you will get the results from round 1 to 3. Thereafter you must decide how much you 
want to invest in the lottery in round 4 to 6. 
Game 2 
In this game you will make investment choices on behalf of yourself in the same way as game 1.  
Payment 
The amount of Norwegian kroner (NOK) you have after the last 6 rounds will be paid out after both 
game 1 and game 2 are finished. In game 1 another participant will have made choices that affect your 
payment in game 1. 
Practical information 
Follow the instructions on the screen, enter (0 to 100) and press the OK-button along the way. Take 
into account that there might be some waiting during the experiment. You shall not talk and/or have 
contact with other participants. If you have got any questions, raise your hand and we will answer. 
After the experiment is over, you write your name on the receipt sheet, then you go and wait outside 
the room. You will then shortly be called in one by one. 
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Instructions to the experiment (translated from Norwegian, group HF1) 
1. The experiment consists of 2 games with 6 rounds. After game 1 there will be a short 
questionnaire, while it after game 2 will be a longer questionnaire. 
2. You shall make investment choices on behalf of yourself the first six rounds (game 1), while 
you in the last six rounds (game 2) shall make decisions on behalf of another.  
3. You will start with 100 experimental money (EK) in every round.  
 
How do the investment choices work?  
 You shall for each round decide how much you want to invest in a lottery (from 0 to 100) 
 With 1/3 chance the lottery will give you 2,5 times the investment in return, and with 2/3 
chance you will lose the investment. (Example: If you invest 100 then 1 out of 3 times you 
will receive 350 and 2 out of 3 times you will get 0 in return)                                                                                                        
 The amount you choose not to invest will be yours for certain (Example: If you bet 0 in the 
lottery you get 100 in the round for certain) 
 You as participant will randomly be divided into type 1, 2 or 3, and every round one of the 
three types will randomly be drawn as a winner  
 100 EK is equal to 16 Norwegian kroner (NOK) every round. 
 
Game 1 
In this game you shall make investment choices on behalf of yourself. After round 1 you will get the 
result from this. Thereafter you must decide how much you want to invest in the lottery in round 2 
before you get the result. The procedure will be the same from round 3 to 6. 
Game 2 
In this game you will make investment choices on behalf of another in the same way as game 1. The 
choices you make will influence another participant’s payment. One randomly chosen participant will 
do the same for you. 
Payment 
The amount of Norwegian kroner (NOK) you have after the first 6 rounds will be paid out after both 
game 1 and game 2 are finished. In game 2 another participant will have made choices that affect your 
payment in game 2. 
Practical information 
Follow the instructions on the screen, enter (0 to 100) and press the OK-button along the way. Take 
into account that there might be some waiting during the experiment. You shall not talk and/or have 
contact with other participants. If you have got any questions, raise your hand and we will answer. 
After the experiment is over, you write your name on the receipt sheet, then you go and wait outside 
the room. You will then shortly be called in one by one. 
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Instructions to the experiment (translated from Norwegian, group HF2) 
1. The experiment consists of 2 games with 6 rounds. After game 1 there will be a short 
questionnaire, while it after game 2 will be a longer questionnaire. 
2. You shall make investment choices on behalf of another the first six rounds (game 1), while 
you in the last six rounds (game 2) shall make decisions on behalf of yourself.  
3. You will start with 100 experimental money (EK) in every round.  
 
How do the investment choices work?  
 You shall for each round decide how much you want to invest in a lottery (from 0 to 100) 
 With 1/3 chance the lottery will give you 2,5 times the investment in return, and with 2/3 
chance you will lose the investment. (Example: If you invest 100 then 1 out of 3 times you 
will receive 350 and 2 out of 3 times you will get 0 in return)                                                                                                        
 The amount you choose not to invest will be yours for certain (Example: If you bet 0 in the 
lottery you get 100 in the round for certain) 
 You as participant will randomly be divided into type 1, 2 or 3, and every round one of the 
three types will randomly be drawn as a winner  
 100 EK is equal to 16 Norwegian kroner (NOK) every round. 
 
Game 1 
In this game you shall make investment choices on behalf of another. The choices you make will 
influence another participant’s payment. One randomly chosen participant will do the same for you. 
After round 1 you will get the result from this. Thereafter you must decide how much you want to 
invest in the lottery in round 2 before you get the result. The procedure will be the same from round 3 
to 6. 
Game 2 
In this game you will make investment choices on behalf of yourself in the same way as game 1.  
Payment 
The amount of Norwegian kroner (NOK) you have after the last 6 rounds will be paid out after both 
game 1 and game 2 are finished. In game 1 another participant will have made choices that affect your 
payment in game 1. 
Practical information 
Follow the instructions on the screen, enter (0 to 100) and press the OK-button along the way. Take 
into account that there might be some waiting during the experiment. You shall not talk and/or have 
contact with other participants. If you have got any questions, raise your hand and we will answer. 
After the experiment is over, you write your name on the receipt sheet, then you go and wait outside 
the room. You will then shortly be called in one by one. 
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Payment-list: 
 
    
     Participant PC-number  10:00  11:00 13:00 14:00 
1 D51537 225 230 105 215 
2 D51525 305 280 275 180 
3 D51603 170 240 170 175 
4 D51555 110 160 110 175 
5 D51561 285 145 390 220 
6 D51524 200 245 170 260 
7 D51655 150 260 140 195 
8 D51675 335 290 285 240 
9 D51636 190 255 170 165 
10 D51558 115 120 110 195 
11 D51587 260 130 320 240 
12 D51588 205 275 180 220 
13 D51503 205 235 190 160 
14 D51519 315 330 320 165 
15 D51542 215 280 190 175 
16 D51580 125 150 105 160 
17 D51590 280 130 380 180 
18 D51566 150 240 170 195 
19 D51619 155 275 205 190 
20 D51564   300 380 180 
 
Group total 3995 4570 4365 3885 
  
    All total 16815 
  
    Average 212,85 
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GLS regression with all background questions 
    R-squared       
Number of observations 316 Within 0,0315 Prob > chi2  0,002 sigma_u17,65 
Number of groups 79 Between 0,3062 Wald chi2(12) 37,33 sigma_e24,16 
Obs. Per group 4 Overall 0,1839     rho=0,348 
Invest Coeffsient Std. Error       z             P>ǀzǀ        95% conf.int   
Others -7,68   2,72 -2,83 0,005   -13,01 -2,36 
Highfrequency -4,29   5,12 -0,84 0,402   -14,33 5,74 
Female -9,51   5,71 -1,66 0,096   -20,7 1,69 
Previous Participation 18,46   5,14 3,59 0    8,38 28,54 
Age 0,992   0,54 1,84 0,066    -0,0655 2,05 
Education 3,41   2,11 1,62 0,106    -0,72 7,54 
Invest (stocks/funds) -3,02   6,45 -0,47 0,64     -15,66 9,62 
Knowledge(stocks/funds) 7,04   3,86 1,83 0,068     -0,52 14,61 
Grade -4,79   4,2 -1,14 0,255     -13,03 3,45 
Personal finance 0,12   7,66 0,02 0,987     -14,9 15,14 
Behavioral Finance 19,64   16,12 1,22 0,223     -11,95 51,23 
Marital status -0,84   2,6 -0,32 0,747     -5,94 4,26 
Constant 46,32   19,86 2,33 0,02      7,39 85,25 
 
 
